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This  paper  uses  a  survey  of  private  firms  to  assess  the  effects  of  corruption  on  the  economic 
prospects  of  firms.  The  paper  studies  whether  corruption  and  crime  affect  sales,  investment 
and  employment  growth  at  the  firm  level,  and  whether  bribes  and  illegal  payments  by  firms 
reduce  bureaucratic  interference.  The  paper  finds  that  corruption  and  crime  substantially 
reduce  sales  growth,  and  that  the  reported  levels  of  corruption  and  bureaucratic 
interferences  are  positively  correlated  at  the  firm  level.  Overall,  the  results  of  the  paper 
suggest  that  corruption  and  crime  substantially  reduce  firm  competitiveness  and  that 
corruption  is  unlikely  to  have  any  positive  effects. 
 
 
   3 
I.  Introduction 
 
While  many  empirical  studies  have  examined  the  connection  between  economic  growth 
and  corruption  at  the  country  level,  only  few  have  looked  at  the  effects  of  corruption  on  the 
economic  prospects  of  firms.  This  paper  aims  at  filling  this  void.  First,  it  studies  whether 
corruption  and  crime  affects  sales,  investment  and  employment  growth  at  the  firm  level. 
Second,  it  examines  whether  bribes  and  illegal  payments  by  firms  reduce  bureaucratic 
interference  by  government  officials.  In  addition,  the  paper  studies  what  type  of  firms  are 
more  likely  to  complain  about  crime  and  corruption,  and  whether  corruption  indicators  that 
rely  on  private  sector  surveys  are  consistent  across  surveys  and  methodologies.   
 
The  paper  finds  that  corruption  and  crime  substantially  reduce  sales  growth.  These  effects 
are  apparent  even  after  firm  characteristics  and  country  fixed  effects  are  taken  into  account. 
Corruption  (and  in  particular  crime)  also  lowers  investment  and  employment  growth, 
though  these  effects  are  smaller  and  not  always  statistically  significant.    This  paper  also 
finds  that  the  reported  levels  of  corruption  and  bureaucratic  interference  are  positively 
correlated  at  the  firm  level,  which  casts  serious  doubts  on  various  theories  that  postulate 
that  corruption  may  increase  efficiency  by  allowing  firms  to  circumvent  government 
regulations.  Overall,  the  results  of  the  paper  suggest  that  corruption  and  crime  substantially 
reduce  firm  competitiveness  and  that  corruption  is  unlikely  to  have  positive  effects. 
 
The  results  show,  on  the  other  hand,  that  corruption  and  crime  are  ubiquitous  in  Latin 
America.  In  this  region,  60  percent  of  the  managers  interviewed  report  that  corruption  is  an 
obstacle  to  doing  business,  28  percent  report  that  bribe  payments  are  common  in  their  line 
of  business,  and  30  percent  that  at  least  one  government  official  requested  bribes  during 
1999.  Further,  corruption  appears  to  affect  all  types  of  firms,  regardless  of  tenure,  size, 
location,  sector  or  type  of  business.  In  contrast,  bureaucratic  red  tape  is  not  more  common 
in  Latin  American  countries  than  in  O.E.C.D  countries.  In  both  cases,  managers  reported 
that  about  five  percent  of  senior  management’s  time  is  spent  dealing  with  bureaucrats.   
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The  rest  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  presents  an  overview  of  the 
literature  on  the  causes  and  consequences  of  corruption.  Section  III  describes  the  data  and 
presents  the  results  on  the  incidence  of  crime  and  corruption.  Section  IV  presents  the  results 
on  the  effects  of  corruption  upon  economic  outcomes.  Section  V  presents  the  results  on  the 
interplay  between  corruption  and  bureaucratic  interference.  Section  VI  concludes. 
 
II.  Literature  Overview 
 
The  growing  interest  in  governance  issues  has  spurred  a  growing  scholarly  literature  about 
the  causes  and  consequences  of  corruption.  Although  a  comprehensive  survey  of  this 
literature  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  our  intention  is  to  summarize  some  of  the  main 
arguments  brought  up  by  the  scholars  doing  applied  research  on  the  topic.  The  ultimate 
goals  are  to  facilitate  the  interpretation  of  the  results  presented  below  and  to  offer  the 
uninitiated  a  quick  peek  into  a  burgeoning  literature.   
 
Figure  1  shows  the  main  factors  associated  with  the  presence  of  corruption.  The 
determinants  of  corruption  are  shown  on  the  left-hand  side  and  its  main  effects  on  the  right-
hand  side.  We  will  begin  with  the  determinants.  On  a  general  level,  the  conjunction  of  rents 
and  unaccountable  public  servants  is  the  main  cause  of  corruption.  It  goes  almost  without 
saying  that  the  higher  the  rents,  and  the  fewer  the  checks  on  public  servants,  the  higher  will 
be  the  opportunities  for  corruption.   
 
<<  Insert  Figure  1  here>> 
 
The  more  regulated  an  economy  and  the  larger  the  amount  of  resources  administered  by  the 
state,  the  higher  will  be  the  rents  in  the  hands  of  public  officials.  Government  regulations 
give  public  officials  the  right  to  disperse  valuable  rents,  increasing  the  scope  for  corruption. 
Bloated  budgets  give  public  officials  greater  ability  to  transfer  public  resources  to  their 
pockets  and  their  cronies,  equally  increasing  the  scope  for  corruption.  Public  rents  tend  to 
be  higher  in  countries  with  large  endowments  of  natural  resources,  which  is  why  many 
champions  of  corruption  are  oil-producing  countries.  Likewise,  public  rents  controlled  by   5 
bureaucrats  are  more  valuable  in  economies  with  fewer  opportunities  and  less  competition, 
which  is  why  countries  less  open  to  foreign  trade  tend  to  be  more  corrupt. 
 
What  makes  public  officials  accountable?  One  can  distinguish  between  two  different  sets  of 
factors:  the  first  has  to  do  with  the  extent  of  democratic  freedoms  and  the  second  with  the 
effectiveness  of  legal  institutions  and  the  pervasiveness  of  anticorruption  norms.  Civil 
liberties  and  political  rights  lower  corruption  by  giving  people  not  only  the  freedom  to 
denounce  corrupt  officials,  but  also  the  ability  to  vote  out  dishonest  politicians.  Obviously, 
an  informed  and  participative  electorate  will  lower  the  ability  of  public  servants  to  get  away 
with  corruption.  A  freer  and  more  influential  press  will  also  reduce  the  scope  of  corruption, 
as  will  the  existence  of  well-functioning  institutional  checks  and  balances.  Greater  political 
instability  will  increase  corruption,  because  instability  generates  the  perception  among 
politicians  and  bureaucrats  that  the  probability  of  winning  elections  does  not  depend  on 
their  actions,  thus  increasing  the  incentives  to  extract  rents.   
 
Institutional  factors  also  reduce  corruption,  and  by  institutional  we  mean  both  formal  laws 
and  informal  norms.  Common  law  systems,  originally  designed  to  protect  people  against 
arbitrary  expropriations  by  the  sovereign,  reduce  corruption  by  giving  private  parties  the 
edge  in  their  disputes  with  the  state.  The  opposite  is  true  for  civil  law  systems,  originally 
used  by  the  sovereign  as  instruments  for  state  building  and  the  regulation  of  economic  life. 
Social  norms  that  encourage  the  challenge  of  authority  by  common  citizens  also  reduce 
corruption,  mainly  by  increasing  public  willingness  to  denounce  malfeasant  politicians  and 
bureaucrats.  These  norms  are  usually  more  widespread  in  Protestant  societies  than  in 
societies  dominated  by  hierarchical  religions  (e.g.,  Catholicism,  Eastern  Orthodoxy,  Islam). 
It  is  not  surprising,  then,  that  corruption  will  tend  to  be  lower  in  Protestant  societies.  For  the 
same  reasons,  corruption  will  tend  to  be  lower  in  more  educated  societies,  which  implies, 
among  other  things,  that  corruption  will  fall  as  income  per  capita  increases.     
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Corruption  will  also  be  higher  if  government  agencies  have  complete  control  of  important 
government  services.  If  different  agencies  compete  to  offer  the  same  service,  competition 
will  drive  rents  toward  zero.  If  only  one  agency  can  offer  the  service,  however,  rents  will  be 
substantial,  given  public  servants  ample  scope  to  collect  bribes.  This  argument  implies  that 
federal  states,  in  which  sub-national  units  compete  to  attract  business  and  sell  government 
services,  will  be  less  corrupt.  In  addition,  decentralization  (and  hence  federalism)  can  lower 
corruption  by  facilitating  the  public  control  of  government  officials. 
 
Unfortunately,  the  empirical  literature  on  the  causes  of  corruption  does  not  permit  to  rank 
the  factors  mentioned  above.  Different  authors  emphasize  different  factors,  and  students  of 
this  sprawling  literature  are  often  at  a  loss  when  trying  to  draw  some  general  conclusions. 
Perhaps  the  main  (and  disheartening)  conclusion  is  that  cultural  and  historical  factors,  many 
of  which  are  not  amenable  to  policy  manipulation,  are  as  important  as  current  policies  in 
the  determination  of  corruption.  Thus,  Protestantism  is  as  important  as  democratization  and 
spontaneous  political  participation  as  important  as  institutional  check  and  balances.  Further, 
definitive  conclusions  are  unlikely,  if  only  because  the  various  determinants  of  corruption 
interact  in  various  and  complex  ways. 
 
The  right-hand  side  of  the  Figure  1  lists  the  main  consequences  of  corruption  brought  up  in 
the  empirical  literature.  First  and  foremost,  corruption  is  negatively  correlated  with 
economic  growth.  Whether  this  correlation  actually  means  that  corruption  is  bad  for  growth 
is  still  a  contentious  issue,  though  most  empirical  studies  appear  to  confirm  it.  The 
pathways  whereby  corruption  affects  growth  are  rarely  spelled  out  in  the  literature. 
Increasing  uncertainty,  the  misallocation  of  talent  and  smaller  rates  of  foreign  direct 
investment  are  among  the  most  frequently  mentioned  pathways. 
 
Corruption  affects  not  only  the  levels  of  foreign  direct  investment,  but  also  its  composition. 
If  corruption  is  widespread,  then  foreign  investors  will  avoid  the  host  country  altogether.  If 
corruption  is  not  prohibitive  but  still  present,  foreign  investors  will  prefer  to  associate  with 
local  partners  because  of  the  importance  of  their  knowledge  about  how  to  deal  with  wicked   7 
bureaucrats.  If  corruption  is  absent,  then  foreign  investors,  especially  when  keen  about 
protecting  intangible  assets,  will  prefer  wholly-owned  subsidiaries.     
 
Corruption  also  increases  the  level  of  unofficial  activity.  Many  entrepreneurs  will  prefer  to 
go  underground  in  order  to  avoid  arbitrary  expropriations  by  malfeasant  officials.  If 
corruption  is  very  high,  the  unofficial  economy  will  expand,  often  reaching  a  substantial 
fraction  of  total  economic  activity.  As  a  result,  tax  revenues  will  fall  and  with  them  the  size 
of  the  government.  Not  surprisingly,  then,  corrupt  governments  tend  also  to  be  small 
governments.  Corruption  also  affects  the  composition  of  government  expenditures. 
Specifically,  corrupt  officials  will  steer  investments  toward  infrastructure  (where  bribe 
collection  is  more  expeditious)  and  away  from  health  and  education  (where  bribe  collection 
is  more  intricate).   
   
Finally,  this  literature  suggests  that  corruption  and  economic  development  (or  the  lack 
thereof)  feed  on  each  other.  Economic  development  in  general  and  the  spread  of  education 
in  particular  lowers  corruption.  But  dwindling  corruption  can  spur  economic  development. 
This  virtuous  circle  is  an  example  of  the  positive  reinforcement  between  government 
quality  and  economic  developments;  arguably  the  main  mechanism  underlying  the 
differences  in  wealth  among  the  nations.  And  still  the  biggest  mystery  of  economics. 
 
 
III.  Corruption  and  Crime  in  the  Private  Sector  Survey   
 
Corruption  is  often  defined  as  the  misuse  of  public  power  for  private  gain.  This  definition 
encompasses  a  wide  range  of  phenomena,  from  a  police  officer  who  accepts  money  from 
drug  traffickers,  to  a  custom  agent  who  extorts  businesses,  to  a  politician  who  appropriates 
royalties.  As  different  as  these  phenomena  are,  they  may  be  driven  by  the  same  causes  and 
have  similar  effects  upon  economic  and  social  outcomes. 
 
One  should  distinguish  between  at  least  two  different  forms  of  corruption.  The  first  form 
refers  to  an  illegal  transaction  involving  public  and  private  parts.  This  includes  bribe 
collection  by  public  officials  and  illegal  payments  by  private  businesses.  The  second  form   8 
does  not  involve  private  parts  and  refers  mainly  to  the  illegal  misappropriation  of  public 
property  by  public  officials,  including  bureaucrats,  elected  politicians  and  judges. 
 
These  forms  of  corruption  affect  the  economic  prospects  of  firms  through  different 
pathways.  Bribes  raise  operational  costs  and  create  uncertainty.  Exporting  firms,  for 
example,  will  be  less  competitive  in  a  country  where  port  official  charge  hefty  bribes  to 
complete  pre-shipment  inspections.  Lawful  businesses  will  suffer  as  well  if  corrupted 
officials  allow  illegal  practices  to  go  unchecked.  Software  firms,  for  example,  may  be 
driven  out  of  business  if  "captured"  officials  decide  not  to  enforce  copyright  regulations.   
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  stealing  and  pilfering  of  government  resources  by  public  officials  do 
not  have  direct  effects  on  the  economic  prospects  of  firms,  but  can  have  huge  indirect 
effects.  Public  finances  will  deteriorate,  creating  uncertainty  and  raising  the  cost  of  credit. 
Infrastructure  will  crumble,  public  services  will  worsen  and  the  general  climate  of  business 
will  suffer  accordingly.   
 
Not  surprisingly,  these  two  forms  of  corruption  tend  to  go  hand  in  hand.  If  bureaucrats  can 
collect  bribes  without  fear  of  punishment,  chances  are  that  they  will  also  have  enough 
leeway  to  unduly  appropriate  public  money.  Similarly,  if  politicians  have  the  power  to 
award  contracts  to  his  cronies,  probably  they  will  also  be  able  to  capture  some  government 
rents.  These  examples  notwithstanding,  it  pays  to  distinguish  between  these  two  forms  of 
corruption,  if  only  to  fully  understand  exactly  what  we  measure  when  we  use  private  sector 
surveys  to  study  corruption. 
 
The  data  used  in  this  paper  is  based  on  a  private  sector  survey  conducted  by  the  World 
Bank  and  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank  in  1999.  About  100  middle  and  top 
managers  in  29  countries,  20  of  them  from  Latin  American,  were  queried  about  their 
perceptions  on  several  areas  of  government  performance,  including  predictability  of 
policies,  reliability  of  the  judiciary,  problems  with  corruption,  crime  and  public  services. 
This  survey  is  a  sequel  of  a  survey  conducted  by  the  World  Bank  in  1996  as  part  of  World   9 
Development  Report  of  1997.
1  The  private  sector  survey  includes  several  questions  on  firm 
characteristics,  including  size,  location,  tenure,  and  sector.  Sector  quotas  were  used  in  all 
countries:  roughly  40  percent  of  the  firms  surveyed  in  each  country  come  from 
manufacture.  None  of  the  country  samples  was  intended  to  be  representative  of  the  universe 
of  firms  of  the  country,  which  should  be  kept  in  mind  when  comparing  country  means.   
 
The  survey  includes  at  least  six  questions  about  corruption.  The  first  question  asks 
respondents  to  judge  the  extent  to  which  corruption  and  crime  are  obstacles  to  the  operation 
and  growth  of  their  business.  The  second  question  asks  respondents  whether  firms  in  their 
line  of  business  often  pay  bribes  to  get  things  done.  The  next  three  questions  focus  on 
various  aspects  of  the  bribe  collection  process:  whether  firms  know  in  advance  the  value  of 
the  bribes  they  have  to  pay,  whether  firms  can  count  on  services  being  delivered  after 
paying  bribes,  and  whether  firms  have  to  pay  bribes  not  to  one  but  to  several  officials.  In 
addition,  the  survey  includes  several  questions  as  to  whether  officials  from  specific 
government  offices  (e.g.,  tax  and  procurement  agencies,  customs  and  courts)  and  state-
owned  companies  (e.g.,  power  and  telephone  companies)  requested  bribes  during  1999.   
 
Table  1  presents  the  sample  means  of  the  questions  described  above.  Questions  containing 
more  than  two  options  were  dichotomized,  so  that  the  averages  could  be  interpreted  as 
percentages.  While  46  percent  of  the  respondents  stated  that  corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  the 
operation  and  growth  of  their  firms  (corr1),  23  percent  stated  that  firms  in  their  line  of 
business  often  pay  bribes  (corr2).  Similarly,  12  percent  of  the  respondents  report  that  they 
often  have  to  pay  bribes  to  more  than  one  official  for  the  same  service  (corr5),  13  percent 
report  that  custom  officials  requested  bribes  during  1999  and  30  percent  that  officials  from 
at  least  one  of  the  agencies  listed  did  the  same  (corr6).  Finally,  53  percent  reported  that 
crime  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business  (crime).   
<<  Insert  Table  1  here>> 
Table  1  also  shows  the  stark  differences  between  Latin  American  and  O.E.C.D  countries  in 
terms  of  corruption  and  crime.  As  measured  by  any  of  the  variables  at  hand,  corruption  is 
                                                                                                 
1  See  World  Bank  (1997)  for  a  thorough  description  of  this  survey.  The  O.E.C.D.  countries  included  in  the 
survey  are  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States. 
The  Latin  American  countries  are  listed  in  Figure  2.     10 
much  greater  in  Latin  America  than  in  O.E.C.D.  countries.  Whereas  almost  60  percent  of 
the  respondents  from  Latin  America  state  that  corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business, 
only  17  percent  of  the  respondents  from  O.E.C.D  countries  report  a  similar  opinion.  As  for 
whether  bribes  are  common  in  their  line  of  business,  28  percent  of  the  respondents  from 
Latin  America  and  12  percent  of  the  respondents  from  O.E.C.D  countries  said  to  agree  with 
that  statement.  Concerning  crime,  the  differences  are  even  more  striking:  while  22  of  the 
respondents  in  O.E.C.D  countries  state  that  crime  is  an  obstacle  to  their  business,  67 
percent  of  the  respondents  in  Latin  American  countries  state  the  same.   
 
Figure  2  shows  the  percentage  of  respondents  in  each  Latin  American  country  who  reported 
that  corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business.  This  percentage  is  the  largest  in  Bolivia, 
Ecuador  and  Mexico,  and  the  lowest  in  Uruguay,  Chile  and  Trinidad  and  Tobago.  Although 
corruption  is  ubiquitous  in  Latin  America,  it  has  different  faces  in  different  countries.  Table 
2  shows  that  custom  officials  are  the  most  corrupt  officials  in  Colombia,  Costa  Rica, 
Uruguay  and  Venezuela,  tax  inspectors  in  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil  and  Panama,  and 
telephone  workers  in  Ecuador,  Haiti  and  Honduras.   
<<Insert  Figure  2  here>> 
Almost  all  of  the  questions  included  in  Table  1  refer  to  the  existence  of  illegal  transactions 
involving  private  and  public  officials  (the  first  form  of  corruption  mentioned  above).  Only 
the  first  question,  which  asks  whether  corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business,  can 
capture  some  general  perceptions  about  the  misuse  of  public  resources  by  unscrupulous 
public  officials  (the  second  form  of  corruption  mentioned  above).  In  consequence,  cross-
country  comparisons  based  on  this  survey  refer  mainly  to  the  first  form  of  corruption  and 
should  be  interpreted  as  such.   
<<  Insert  Table  2  here>> 
In  what  follows,  we  focus  on  three  measurement  issues.  First,  we  investigate  the  degree  of 
association  at  the  country  level  between  the  variables  listed  in  Table  1.  Second,  we 
investigate  whether  or  not  the  country  means  of  the  same  variables  are  consistent  across 
surveys.  And  last,  we  investigate  what  attributes  make  firms  more  likely  to  suffer  from 
corruption  and  crime.   
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Correlation  between  Measures  of  Corruption  and  Crime 
 
Table  3  displays  the  correlation  coefficients  between  the  country  means  of  the  different 
variables  listed  in  Table  1.  Most  variables  are  highly  correlated.  In  countries  where  most 
respondents  state  that  corruption  is  a  major  obstacle  to  doing  business  (corr1),  they  also 
state  that  bribes  are  common  in  their  line  of  business  (corr2).    Similarly,  in  countries  where 
most  respondents  state  that  corruption  is  an  obstacle  (corr1),  they  were  also  much  more 
likely  to  report  that  public  officials  requested  bribes  during  1999  (corr6).  Moreover, 
perceptions  of  whether  corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business  are  aligned  with 
perceptions  of  whether  crime  constitutes  a  similar  hurdle. 
<<  Insert  Table  3  here>> 
Table  4  looks  in  greater  detail  at  the  connection  between  corruption  and  crime.  Countries 
were  divided  into  two  groups  according  to  whether  or  not  more  than  half  of  the  managers 
interviewed  report  that  corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business.  Similarly,  countries 
were  divided  in  another  two  groups  according  to  whether  or  not  the  same  people  report  that 
crime  is  an  obstacle  to  the  operating  of  their  business.  Table  4  shows  that  in  only  one 
country  the  two  partitions  do  not  coincide,  which  points  to  the  fact  that  perceptions  about 
the  prevalence  of  crime  and  corruption  go  hand  in  hand.  So,  firms  in  many  countries  are 
subject  to  a  double  curse:  they  lack  protection  from  theft  and  violence,  and  they  are  at 
mercy  of  corrupt  public  officials.
2  It  goes  almost  without  saying  that  doing  business  under 
these  circumstances  could  be  a  heroic  activity. 
<<Insert  Table  4  here>> 
Cross-survey  Correlations 
 
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  private  sector  survey  is  a  sequel  of  a  survey  conducted  by  the 
World  Bank  in  1997.  Several  questions  about  corruption  and  crime,  and  many  others  about 
policy  predictability,  bureaucratic  red  tape  and  government  quality  in  general,  were 
included  in  both  surveys,  allowing  comparisons  between  the  two.  The  original  survey 
comprised  69  countries,  including  58  from  developing  regions  and  9  from  Latin  America. 
The  new  survey  comprised  29  countries,  including  20  from  Latin  America.  Only  15 
                                                                                                 
2  This  fact  is  referred  to  as  the  lawlessness  syndrome  in  the  World  Bank  (1997).     12 
countries  were  included  in  both  surveys,  meaning  that  cross-survey  comparisons  must  be 
limited  to  this  small  sample.
3 
 
This  problem  notwithstanding,  these  comparisons  shed  light  on  the  reliability  of  the  country 
means  as  indices  of  corruption.  This  is  important  because  samples  are  not  necessarily 
representative  of  the  countries  under  consideration.  If  country  averages  are  similar  from 
one  survey  to  the  next,  this  will  give  credence  to  cross-country  comparisons  presented 
above.  Otherwise,  one  must  be  especially  cautious  about  such  comparisons. 
 
Table  5  presents  a  comparison  between  the  two  surveys.  For  three  of  the  six  variables  under 
analysis,  there  seems  to  be  a  high  degree  of  correlation  between  the  two  surveys.  The 
results  show,  in  particular,  that  country  means  based  on  questions  as  to  whether  corruption 
and  crime  are  obstacles  to  doing  business  (corr1  and  crime)  and  bribes  are  common  (corr2) 
vary  very  little  from  one  survey  to  the  next.  By  contrast,  means  based  on  questions  as  to 
whether  firms  know  the  values  of  the  bribes  and  can  count  on  services  being  delivered 
(corr3,  corr4  and  corr5)  yield  much  more  volatile  results.  In  sum,  direct  questions  about 
the  existence  of  corruption  appear  to  yield  reliable  corruption  measures.  More  elaborate 
questions  appear  to  be  more  problematic.   
<<  Insert  Table  5  here>> 
Figure  3  shows  that  there  exists  a  high  correlation  between  the  corruption  indices  derived 
from  the  1999  version  of  private  sector  survey  and  a  composite  index  of  corruption 
computed  by  Kaufmann  and  his  collaborators  at  the  World  Bank.
4  In  sum,  the  previous 
results  suggest  that  survey  means  are  enough  to  gauge  differences  in  corruption  among 
countries.   
                                                                                                 
3  These  countries  are  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Canada,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Mexico,  Portugal,  Spain,  United  Kingdom,  United  States  and  Venezuela. 
4  Kaufmann,  Krary  and  Zoido-Lobaton  (1999)  built  an  index  of  corruption  by  combining  information  from 
several  existing  indices  using  an  unobserved  component  method.  Most  corruption  indices  are  based  on  either 
survey  of  experts  or  surveys  are  firms.  The  former  involved  only  a  few  experts  per  country  whereas  the  latter 
usually  involved  hundred  or  more  forms  per  country.  It  is  worth  noting  that  this  index  is  based  partially  on 
country  means  derived  from  the  private  sector  survey  carried  out  by  the  World  Bank  in  1997;  values  that  are 
in  turn  highly  correlated  to  the  country  means  derived  from  the  survey  used  in  this  paper.     13 
<<Insert  Figure  3  here>> 
Corruption,  Crime  and  Firm  Characteristics 
 
Data  from  the  private  sector  survey  can  be  used  to  study  what  type  of  firms  are  more  likely 
to  report  that  corruption  and  crime  affect  them  one  way  or  another.    This  exercise  does  not 
intend  to  make  any  causal  claims:    the  results  may  either  indicate  what  type  of  firm 
characteristics  induces  corruption  or  how  corruption  alters  the  size  and  the  business 
orientation  of  the  firms.  This  problem  notwithstanding,  this  analysis  can  provide  some 
insights  about  the  mechanisms  of  corruption  and  its  consequences  for  competitiveness:   
learning  about  the  victims  can  often  teach  us  something  about  the  nature  of  the  crime.   
 
We  use  the  following  empirical  model  to  study  the  connection  between  the  incidence  of 
corruption  and  firm  characteristics: 
ij j ij ij c e l b + + + = X Y ,                                                          (1) 
where  Yij    is  dummy  variable  showing  whether  the  manager  of  firm  i  that  is  located  in 
country  j  report  the  incidence  of  corruption,  Xij  is  a  vector  of  firm  characteristics  (including 
sector,  size,  tenure,  location,  whether  the  firm  has  foreign  or  state  ownership,  and  whether 
the  firm  sell  goods  or  services  to  the  government),  lj    is  a  country  effect  and  eij  is  an  error 
term.  Country  effects  are  included  to  control  for  unobserved  country  attributes.  One  may 
argue,  for  example,  that  individuals  living  in  more  corrupt  countries  have  looser  standards 
for  judging  corrupt  practices.  Country-fixed  effects  control  for  these  differences,  among 
others. 
 
In  order  to  minimize  spurious  correlations  between  perceived  corruption  and  firm 
characteristics,  we  control  for  the  propensity  of  managers  to  complain.  If  managers  of  small 
firms  are  more  likely  to  complain  about  all  aspects  of  the  business  environment,  we  may 
wrongly  conclude  that  small  firms  are  more  liable  to  suffer  from  corruption  and  crime.  We 
use  the  average  rating  of  the  quality  and  efficiency  of  five  public  services:  roads,  postal 
service,  power,  telephone  and  water  to  approximate  a  respondent’s  tendency  to  complain. 
Because  objective  ratings  of  these  services  should  not  differ  much  across  firms,  actual   14 
differences  in  the  ratings  can  be  interpreted  as  differences  among  managers  in  their 
tendency  to  complain  indistinctively  about  all  aspects  of  the  business  environment.
5   
 
Table  6  shows  the  average  values  of  the  main  independent  variables  used  in  the  analysis. 
The  average  values  hide  important  variations  among  countries.  In  the  United  Kingdom  only 
five  percent  of  the  firms  included  in  the  survey  have  more  than  500  employees,  in 
Colombia  more  than  half  exceed  this  value.  In  Italy  over  60  percent  of  the  firms  do 
business  with  the  State;  in  Portugal  only  20  percent  do  so.  Importantly,  these  differences 
reflect  not  so  much  differences  in  the  structure  of  production  of  the  countries  under 
analysis,  as  differences  in  the  sampling  procedures. 
<<  Insert  Table  6  here>> 
We  use  four  different  dependent  variables:  whether  corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing 
business  (corr1),  whether  bribery  is  common  in  one’s  line  of  business  (corr2),  whether  at 
least  one  of  government  agencies  listed  in  Table  1  requested  bribes  in  1999  (corr6),  and 
whether  crime  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business  (crime).  The  same  specification  was  used  in 
all  four  cases,  so  that  one  can  evaluate  the  extent  to  which  the  results  are  robust  to  the 
changes  in  the  definitions  of  the  dependent  variable. 
 
Table  7  presents  the  estimation  results.  Results  are  based  on  a  Probit  model,  but  they  do  not 
differ  much  if  other  estimation  methods  are  used.  No  systematic  relationship  between  firm 
characteristics  and  corruption  is  apparent,  apart  from  its  higher  incidence  among  small 
firms.  Neither  firms  that  sell  goods  and  services  to  the  government  nor  firms  in 
manufacturing  appear  more  likely  to  suffer  from  government  arbitrariness  in  the  form  of 
corruption.  There  is  slight  evidence  that  firms  with  some  government  ownership  are  less 
likely  to  suffer  from  corruption,  but  this  result  is  not  always  significant  and  may  be  driven 
not  so  much  by  actual  differences  in  corruption,  as  by  differences  in  the  willingness  to 
report  corrupt  practices.   
 
As  in  the  case  of  corruption,  small  firms  are  more  likely  to  perceive  crime  as  an  obstacle  to 
business  operations  than  larger  firms.  Firms  located  in  the  capital  and  in  large  cities  as  well 
                                                                                                 
5  This  correction  was  first  proposed  by  Kaufmann  and  Wei  (1999).     15 
as  firms  that  have  some  government  ownership  are  less  likely  to  complain  about  crime.  The 
negative  connection  between  city  size  and  crime  is  at  odds  with  evidence  from 
victimization  surveys,  suggesting  that  the  causal  factors  underlying  crime  affecting 
businesses  differ  from  those  underlying  crime  affecting  people.
  6   
 
There  are  some  worthwhile  differences  between  Latin  America  and  the  developed  world  in 
the  patterns  of  corruption  across  firms.  In  O.E.C.D.  countries  firms  that  have  sales  to  the 
state  sector  tend  to  complain  more  about  corruption,  while  in  Latin  America  they  do  not. 
However,  the  negative  connection  between  firm  size  and  the  incidence  of  corruption  is 
stronger  in  Latin  America  than  in  the  O.E.C.D.  One  can  speculate  that  while  in  developed 
countries  corruption  affects  mainly  firms  that  have  deals  with  the  government  (corruption  is 
often  no  more  than  a  calculated  nuisance  for  these  firms),  in  Latin  America  corruption 
affects  mainly  smaller  firms.   
<<Insert  Table  7  here>> 
IV.  Corruption,  Crime  and  Economic  Outcomes 
 
Recent  empirical  research  shows  that  growth  rates  tend  to  be  lower  in  countries  with  higher 
levels  of  corruption.  Various  mechanisms  have  been  mentioned  to  explain  this  fact: 
corruption  depresses  foreign  and  domestic  investment,  reduces  innovation  and  increases  the 
operating  costs  of  firms.  In  this  section,  we  use  the  private  sector  survey  described  earlier  to 
examine  the  effects  of  corruption  on  the  economic  outcomes  of  firms.   
 
The  private  sector  survey  includes  several  questions  about  firm  performance.  Managers 
were  asked  to  approximate  the  growth  of  their  companies’  sales,  investment,  exports, 
employment  and  debt  during  the  three  years  previous  to  the  survey.  We  assume  that  these 
answers  capture  the  recent  performance  of  the  firms  under  analysis.  Indirect  evidence  gives 
credence  to  this  assumption.  For  one  thing,  country  means  are  highly  correlated  with 
average  GDP  growth  (see  Figure  4).
7  For  another,  the  best  performing  firms  in  the  sample 
are,  as  expected,  younger  firms  with  foreign  ownership  that  export  part  of  their  production. 
                                                                                                 
6  See,  for  example,  Gaviria  and  Pages  (2000).   
7  The  correlation  coefficient  between  GDP  growth  and  average  sales  growth  is  0.64.  The  coefficients  between 
GDP  growth,  on  the  one  hand,  and  investment  and  employment  growth,  on  the  other,  are  0.73  and  0.61.     16 
Interestingly  enough,  firms  that  have  some  type  of  government  ownership  are  the  worst 
performing  of  all. 
<<Insert  Figure  4  here>> 
We  focus  on  three  indices  of  performance:  reported  growth  rates  of  sales,  investment  and 
employment.  The  three  indices  are  highly  correlated  at  the  firm  level:    the  correlation 
coefficient  between  sales  growth  and  employment  growth  is  0.58,  and  all  coefficients  are 
greater  than  0.45.  The  mean  growth  rate  of  sales  in  the  whole  sample  is  9.2%,  the  mean 
growth  of  investment  12.4%,  and  the  mean  growth  of  employment  3.4%.  Mean  growth 
rates  of  employment  and  sales  are  much  higher  in  O.E.C.D.  countries  than  in  Latin 
American  countries.  For  employment,  the  mean  rates  for  O.E.C.D  and  Latin  American 
countries  are  7.6%  and  1.5%,  respectively.  For  sales,  the  corresponding  values  are  14.2% 
and  7.0%. 
 
Country  means  of  firm  performance  and  corruption  indicators  are  highly  correlated.  The 
correlation  coefficient  between  mean  sales  growth  and  the  percentage  of  managers  that 
state  that  corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business  is  0.42.  Somewhat  smaller  values, 
though  still  large,  are  obtained  if  other  indicators  of  economic  performance  and  corruption 
are  used.  But  cross-country  correlations  based  on  average  indices  can  have  serious 
drawbacks,  if  only  because  they  can  be  driven  by  differences  in  country  characteristics  that 
are  correlated  with  both  economic  activity  and  corruption.  In  what  follows,  we  abstract 
from  cross-country  differences  and  focus  on  the  relationship  between  economic 
performance  and  the  incidence  of  corruption  at  the  firm  level. 
 
  Our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  the  following  model   
ij j ij ij c n l b d + + + + = X Corrup S ,                                                                  (2) 
where  Sij  is  the  rate  of  growth  of  sales  of  firm  i  in  country  j,  Corrup  is  an  indicator  of 
corruption,  Xij  is  a  vector  of  firm  characteristics  (including  sector,  size,  tenure,  location, 
whether  the  firm  has  foreign  or  state  ownership,  and  whether  the  firm  sell  goods  or  services 
to  the  government),  lj    is  a  country  effect  and  eij  is  an  error  term.
    A  negative  value  of 
￿
 
would  indicate  that  corruption  negatively  affects  economic  performance  at  the  firm  level. 
Several  mechanisms  can  explain  and  adverse  effect  of  corruption  and  crime  on  firm   17 
performance.  First,  corruption  and  crime  raise  operational  costs,  lowering  competitiveness 
and  ultimately  lowering  sales.  Second,  crime  and  corruption  prevent  companies  from 
entering  profitable  business,  limiting  the  opportunities  for  growth  and  lowering  sales, 
investment  and  employment.  Finally,  crime  and  corruption  may  cause  firms  to  lose 
valuable  human  and  financial  resources,  likewise  lowering  competitiveness.  Unfortunately, 
the  data  at  hand  does  not  allow  distinguishing  among  these  mechanisms,  which  are  likely  to 
operate  simultaneously.   
 
Controlling  for  the  propensity  of  managers  to  complain  is  crucial  in  this  context.  If 
managers  complain  indistinctively  about  everything,  a  positive  but  spurious  correlation 
between  bad  economic  outcomes  and  reported  corruption  would  ensue.  As  we  did  in 
Section  III,  we  use  managers’  rating  of  public  services  to  approximate  the  propensity  of 
respondents  to  complain.  Because  objective  ratings  of  these  services  should  not  differ  much 
across  firms,  differences  can  be  interpreted  as  differences  among  managers  in  their 
tendency  to  complain  indistinctively  about  all  aspects  of  the  business  environment.   
 
We  estimate  Equation  (2)  using  OLS.  We  control  for  all  firm  characteristics  included  in 
Table  6,  as  well  as  for  country  specific  fixed  effects.  Controlling  for  country  fixed  effects  is 
important  given  the  high  correlation  between  countrywide  averages  of  firm  performance 
and  countrywide  indicators  of  corruption.  We  use  four  distinct  corruption  indicators:  corr1 
(is  corruption  a  significant  obstacle  to  doing  business?),  corr2  (are  bribes  common  in  their 
line  of  business?),  corr6  (did  public  officials  request  bribes  during  1999?),  and  crime  (is 
crime  an  obstacle  to  doing  business).  The  implicit  assumption  is  that  firms  that  answer 
affirmatively  to  these  questions  are  more  likely  to  experience  harassment  by  public  officials 
and  criminals.   
 
Table  8  shows  the  effect  of  corruption  and  crime  upon  the  rate  of  growth  of  sales.  These 
rates  are  almost  three  percentage  points  (or  30  percent)  lower  in  firms  where  managers 
report  that  corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business  than  in  firms  where  managers  report 
otherwise.  Similarly,  sales  growth  is  35  percent  lower  in  firms  where  managers  complain   18 
about  crime  than  in  firms  where  managers  do  not.  The  same  differences  are  smaller  and  no 
longer  statistically  significant  if  alternative  corruption  indicators  are  used.     
 
Table  9  shows  the  effects  of  crime  and  corruption  on  investment  growth.  Unlike  the 
previous  results,  no  noticeable  differences  in  investment  growth  between  firms  that 
complain  about  corruption  and  firms  that  do  not.  Investment  growth  is  two  percentage 
points  (or  16  percent)  lower  in  firms  that  report  that  crime  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business 
than  in  firms  that  report  the  opposite,  but  this  difference  is  not  statistically  significant.   
Table  10  repeats  the  exercise  for  employment  growth.  The  results  show  that  perceptions  of 
corruption  are  not  linked  to  employment  growth  at  the  firm  level:    employment  growth  is 
1.5  percentage  points  (or  47  percent)  lower  in  firms  that  report  that  crime  is  an  obstacle 
than  in  firms  that  do  not,  but  this  difference  is  not  statistically  significant.   
<<  Insert  Tables  8,  9  and  10  here>> 
Two  main  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  previous  analysis.  First,  the  effects  of  crime 
and  corruption  upon  the  economic  prospects  of  firms  appear  to  be  limited  to  growth  in 
sales.  Second,  crime  appears  to  have  a  more  pronounced  effect  on  economic  outcomes  than 
corruption.  These  conclusions  hold  up  after  splitting  the  sample  into  developed  and 
developing  countries  and  after  changing  the  sets  of  controls  used  in  the  analysis. 
Interestingly,  the  relationship  between  economic  performance  and  corruption  is  the  same 
irrespective  of  the  level  of  development  of  the  countries  under  study.     
 
V.  Corruption  and  Bureaucratic  Interference  in  the  Private  Sector  Survey 
 
Figure  5  shows  that  there  is  a  high  correlation  between  indicators  of  corruption  and 
regulatory  burden  at  the  country  level.  Both  indicators  were  taken  from  Kaufmann  et  al. 
(1999).
8  While  this  correlation  can  be  accounted  for  in  many  ways,  most  stories  will  tend  to 
fall  into  two  main  groups.  In  the  first,  which  goes  back  at  least  to  Krueger  (1974),  excessive 
government  restrictions  on  economic  activity  give  rise  to  illegal  attempts  by  private  parties 
to  circumvent  them.  In  the  second,  which  has  been  eloquently  expounded  by  Shleifer  and 
                                                                                                 
8  Both  indicators  were  taken  from  Kaufmann  et  al.  (1999).  The  corruption  indicator  was  already  described. 
The  indicator  of  regulatory  burden  summarizes  perceptions  about  the  burdens  imposed  by  excessive 
regulation  in  areas  such  as  foreign  trade  and  business  development.     19 
Vishny  (1998),  restrictions  on  economic  activity  and  bureaucratic  procedures  are  seen  as  a 
consequence,  not  simply  as  the  initiators,  of  rent-seeking  activities.  In  the  latter  story, 
bureaucrats  usually  adjust  government  restrictions  in  order  to  maximize  bribe  collection 
and  not  simply  take  them  as  given. 
<<Figure  5>> 
According  to  the  first  story,  bureaucrats  do  not  have  enough  leeway  to  change  government 
regulations,  which  can  be  considered  the  result  of  well-intended  efforts  to  prevent  market 
failures  and  increase  productivity,  but  can  usually  decide  whether  or  not  to  enforce  them.  It 
is  assumed  that  bureaucrats  use  all  the  power  at  their  discretion  for  personal  gain:  they 
charge  interested  private  parts  for  the  privilege  of  skipping  bureaucratic  procedures.  For 
example,  a  business  license  authority  is  bribed  by  an  entrepreneur  who  wants  to  avoid  a 
lengthy  registration  process.  Or  a  customs  official  is  bribed  by  a  businessman  who  seeks 
exemption  from  shipment  inspections.   
 
In  this  story,  corruption  may  allow  private  agents  to  buy  lower  effective  red  tape,  thus 
reducing  the  detrimental  effects  of  exaggerated  government  regulation.  In  short,  corruption 
can  be  efficiency  enhancing.  Lui  (1985)  has  formalized  this  idea  by  means  of  a  queuing 
model  in  which  the  presence  of  corruption  not  only  allows  more  willing  private  agents  to 
move  ahead  in  the  queue,  but  it  also  induces  bureaucrats  to  increase  the  speed  with  which 
they  process  the  queue.   
 
According  to  the  second  story,  red  tape  and  corruption  are  two  sides  of  the  same  coin  and 
the  efficiency-enhancing  role  of  corruption  no  longer  applies.  The  point  is  that  government 
regulations  are  no  longer  an  exogenous  hurdle  that  can  be  partially  mitigated  through  illegal 
payments,  but  an  instrument  used  by  bureaucrats  to  enlarge  their  bounty.  In  this  story, 
unmitigated  corruption  not  only  will  be  harmful  in  terms  of  economic  efficiency,  but  will 
also  cause  obtrusive  regulation  to  increase.  While  in  the  first  model  regulation  begets 
corruption,  in  the  second  the  causality  is  the  opposite;  it  is  corruption  now  that  begets 
regulation. 
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  Distinguishing  between  these  two  models  is  important  because  they  imply  a  fundamental 
difference  of  emphasis  when  it  comes  to  design  anti-corruption  policy  interventions. 
According  to  the  first  model,  a  policy  aimed  at  lowering  corruption  should  focus  on 
curtailing  unnecessary  government  regulation.  According  to  second  story,  a  similarly 
motivated  policy  should  focus  directly  on  curtailing  corruption,  perhaps  through  increasing 
expected  punishment  to  corrupt  officials  and  increasing  transparency  in  public  matters.  If 
successful,  such  policy  should  lower  government  regulation  as  well. 
 
Unfortunately,  the  available  cross-country  evidence  offers  few  clues  as  to  which  of  these 
alternatives  models  bear  closer  resemblance  to  reality.  As  argued  earlier,  both  models 
predict  a  positive  connection  between  the  extent  of  corruption  and  the  extent  of  nominal 
bureaucratic  red  tape  (see  Figure  5).  Empirical  evidence  showing  that  corruption  is  bad  for 
growth  could  be  interpreted  as  indirect  evidence  in  favor  of  the  second  model.  But  this 
evidence  is  hardly  enough  to  put  up  a  definitive  verdict.  Below,  we  follow  Kaufmann  and 
Wei  (1999)  and  present  firm-level  evidence  that  can  be  used  to  distinguish  between  the  two 
competing  models  under  consideration. 
 
Our  empirical  analysis  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  bribe  payments  and  the  amount 
of  time  wasted  by  senior  managers  dealing  with  bureaucrats.  If  the  first  model  above 
applies,  firm  managers  will  be  able  to  reduce  the  nominal  levels  of  red  tape  by  means  of 
illegal  payments.  This  implies  that,  all  else  equal,  firms  that  do  pay  bribes  will  be  less 
affected  by  bureaucratic  interference  and  that  hence  their  senior  management  will  waste 
less  time  dealing  with  bureaucrats.  From  this,  we  can  derive  a  simple  hypothesis. 
 
H1:  All  else  equal,  time  wasted  in  bureaucratic  red  tape  will  be  lower  in  firms  that  pay 
bribes. 
 
However,  if  bureaucrats  are  able  to  modify  government  regulations  on  a  firm-by-firm  basis, 
they  will  impose  more  stringent  regulations  on  those  firms  more  willing  to  tolerate  red  tape 
and  bureaucratic  delay.  Kaufmann  and  Wei  (1999)  formalize  the  second  story  sketched 
above,  and  show  that  if  bureaucrats  can  vary  nominal  regulations  from  one  firm  to  another,   21 
effective  bureaucratic  interference  will  be  higher  in  firms  that  do  pay  bribes.  In  this  model, 
bureaucrats  customize  nominal  regulation,  imposing  the  most  intricate  and  complex 
restrictions  on  the  most  tolerant  firms.  These  firms  will  pay  higher  bribes,  seeking  to  reduce 
the  suffocating  levels  of  red  tape  forced  upon  them,  but  despite  the  higher  bribes,  they  will 
still  bear  a  higher  effective  level  of  red  tape.  From  this,  we  can  derive  an  alternative 
hypothesis. 
 
H2:  All  else  equal,  time  wasted  in  bureaucratic  red  tape  will  be  higher  in  firms  that  pay 
higher  bribes. 
 
We  test  the  previous  hypotheses  using  data  from  the  private  sector  survey.  Managers  in  this 
survey  were  queried  about  what  fraction  of  their  time  was  spent  dealing  with  bureaucrats. 
The  specific  question  was:  “what  percentage  of  senior  management’s  time  per  year  is  spent 
in  dealing  with  government  officials  about  the  application  and  interpretation  of  laws  and 
regulations?”  We  interpret  this  percentage  as  the  extent  of  effective  bureaucratic  red  tape 
borne  by  each  firm.  Our  test  hinges  on  whether  or  not  this  percentage  is  higher  in  firms  in 
which  managers  report  that  corruption  is  either  an  obstacle  to  doing  business  or  a  common 
practice  in  their  line  of  business. 
<<Table  11>> 
Table  11  shows  the  distribution  across  firms  of  the  percentage  of  management’s  time  spent 
dealing  with  bureaucrats.  Most  managers  (64%)  report  no  time  at  all  spent  in  this  matter. 
The  mean  value  of  this  variable  is  4.6%.  Surprisingly,  the  mean  for  developed  countries  is 
higher  than  the  mean  for  Latin  American  countries  (5.8%  and  4.1%,  respectively).  Insofar 
as  mean  values  are  a  good  proxy  for  the  extent  of  effective  regulatory  burden  in  a  country 
or  region,  the  data  at  hand  suggests  that,  unlike  the  case  of  corruption,  the  burden  of  red 
tape  is  not  much  higher  in  developing  countries  than  in  developed  ones.
9 
 
We  use  the  following  empirical  model  to  study  the  interplay  between  effective  bureaucratic 
red  tape  and  corruption  at  the  firm  level: 
                                                                                                 
9  The  correlation  coefficient  between  the  country  means  of  this  variable  and  the  Kaufmann  index  of 
regulatory  burden  is  almost  zero,  suggesting  that  the  effective  and  nominal  levels  of  bureaucratic  interference 
can  be  quite  at  odds.     22 
ij j ij ij c e l b a + + + + = X Corrup B ,                                                    (3) 
where  Bij  is  the  percentage  of  time  spent  dealing  with  bureaucrats  by  the  senior 
management  of  firm  i  in  country  j,  Corrup  is  an  indicator  of  corruption,  Xij  is  a  vector  of 
firm  characteristics  (including  sector,  size,  tenure,  location,  whether  the  firm  has  foreign  or 
state  ownership,  and  whether  the  firm  sell  goods  or  services  to  the  government),  lj    is  a 
country  effect  and  eij  is  an  error  term.
10    A  negative  value  of  a  would  indicate  that 
corruption  reduces  the  extent  of  effective  bureaucratic  red  tape  (i.e.,  H1  is  true).  A  positive 
value  would  indicate  that  corruption  and  bureaucratic  red  tape  go  hand  in  hand  (i.e.,  H2  is 
true). 
 
We  control  for  all  firm  characteristics  listed  in  Table  6,  as  well  as  for  the  propensity  of  the 
respondents  to  complain  indiscriminately  and  for  country  fixed  effects.  We  use  the  same 
corruption  and  crime  indicators  used  in  the  previous  section:  corr1  (corruption  is  an 
obstacle  to  doing  business),  corr2  (corruption  is  common  in  one’s  line  of  business),  corr6 
(public  officials  requested  bribes  during  1999),  and  crime  (crime  is  a  obstacle  to  doing 
business).
11  We  assume  that  firms  that  answer  these  questions  affirmatively  are  more  likely 
to  pay  bribes.   
 
We  estimate  Equation  (3)  using  a  Tobit  model.  This  type  of  empirical  model  is  appropriate 
in  this  case  because  of  the  peculiar  distribution  of  the  dependent  variable,  which  includes  a 
large  mass  of  observations  at  the  value  of  zero.  One  can  argue  that  respondents  only 
reported  that  they  did  spend  some  time  dealing  with  bureaucrats  if  such  time  exceeds  some 
unknown  positive  value.  If  this  assumption  is  true,  the  dependent  variable  will  be  censored 
and  a  Tobit  model  will  be  the  right  one.
12 
 
Table  12  presents  the  main  results.  The  fraction  of  time  wasted  by  senior  managers  dealing 
with  red  tape  is  larger  in  firms  in  which  managers  state  that  corruption  is  a  significant 
                                                                                                 
10  See  Kaufmann  and  Wei  (1999)  for  a  formal  model  that  can  be  used  to  justify  this  specification.   
11  We  also  study  the  relationship  between  economic  outcomes  and  the  other  corruption  indicators  defined  in 
Section  III.  Neither  of  these  indicators  have  a  consistent  relationship  with  economic  outcomes  (unreported 
results).     
12  See,  for  example,  Kennedy    (1998).   23 
obstacle  to  doing  business  than  in  firms  in  which  manager  state  otherwise.  On  average,  this 
fraction  is  more  than  two  percentage  points  higher  in  the  former  than  in  the  latter. 
Similarly,  this  fraction  of  time  is  larger  in  firms  whose  mangers  say  that  public  officials 
requested  bribes  during  1999  than  in  firms  whose  managers  report  no  bribe  requests.  The 
difference  in  this  case  is  almost  four  percentage  points  (90%  of  the  sample  mean).   
 
The  previous  results  do  not  change  much  if  other  estimation  methods  and  other  covariates 
are  used.  The  results  are  also  very  similar  if  the  sample  is  restricted  to  either  Latin  America 
or  O.E.C.D  countries,  which  suggests  that  the  relationship  in  question  is  not  mediated  by 
the  level  of  development:  it  has  the  same  sign  and  similar  size  in  both  developed  and 
developing  countries.   
<<Insert  Table  12  here>> 
The  results  provide  compelling  evidence  in  favor  of  the  second  hypothesis  presented  above. 
There  appears  to  be  a  positive  connection  between  bribe  payments  and  effective 
bureaucratic  delay  at  the  firm  level.  The  same  result  was  obtained  by  Kaufmann  and  Wei 
(1999)  using  a  similar  empirical  strategy  and  data  from  three  distinct  private  surveys:  the 
1996  and  1997  surveys  for  the  Global  Competitiveness  Report  and  the  1996  survey  for  the 
World  Development  Report.  Taken  together,  these  results  suggest  that  public  officials  are 
able  to  manipulate  nominal  bureaucratic  restrictions  so  as  to  increase  bribe  collection.  Thus, 
nominal  regulations  should  not  be  considered  exogenously  given  but  endogenously 
determined  by  corrupt  officials  seeking  to  extract  higher  bribes  from  private  business. 
 
Our  empirical  results  are  broadly  consistent  with  the  idea  that  regulation  is  mainly  a 
mechanism  to  create  rents  for  bureaucrats.  Economic  regulations  should  not  then  be 
perceived  simply  as  well-intended  attempts  to  prevent  market  failures  and  increase 
productivity  that  can  inadvertently  create  corruption.  Rather,  they  should  be  perceived  as 
devices  to  transfer  rents  from  firms  and  individuals  to  bureaucrats.
13 
 
                                                                                                 
13  See  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1998)  for  an  eloquent  exposition  of  this  view,  referred  by  them  as  the  Grabbing 
Hand  hypothesis.       24 
VI.  Conclusions   
 
This  paper  examines  both  the  effects  of  corruption  and  crime  on  the  economic  outcomes  of 
firms  and  the  link  between  corruption  and  effective  bureaucratic  interference  at  the  firm 
level.   
 
The  results  show  that  corruption  has  a  noticeable  effect  on  the  economic  outcomes  of  firms 
in  the  sense  that  these  outcomes  tend  to  be  lower  in  firms  where  managers  report  that 
corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business  than  in  firms  where  managers  report  otherwise. 
In  the  same  vein,  the  results  show  that  crime  has  a  similar  (if  not  higher)  effect  on  the 
economic  outcomes  of  firms.  Both  effects  are  noticeable  even  after  taking  into  account  firm 
and  country  characteristics.  On  the  whole,  the  evidence  indicates  that  corruption  and  crime 
substantially  reduce  competitiveness. 
   
The  results  also  indicate  that  corruption  and  effective  bureaucratic  interference  (measured 
as  the  fraction  of  senior  management’s  time  spent  dealing  with  bureaucrats)  go  hand  in 
hand.  That  is,  bureaucratic  interference  is  higher  in  firms  that  are  more  likely  to  pay  bribes. 
This  result  flies  in  the  face  of  several  theories  that  predict  that  bribes  can  increase 
efficiency  by  allowing  firms  to  avoid  exaggerated  government  regulations.  The  results 
suggest,  in  contrast,  that  government  regulations  are  strategically  used  by  bureaucrats  to 
maximize  bribe  collection. 
 
Finally,  the  results  show  that  that  the  prevalence  of  corruption  and  crime  differs 
substantially  from  one  country  to  the  next,  and  that  both  phenomena  are  closely  associated. 
Government  arbitrariness  in  the  form  of  corruption  and  government’s  inability  to  enforce 
contracts  and  protect  property  rights  are  flip  sides  of  the  same  problem—a  problem  that 
affects  all  types  of  firms,  irrespective  of  their  area  of  business,  location  or  type  of 
ownership,  and  that  constitutes,  without  a  doubt,  one  of  the  most  serious  hurdles  to  private 
entrepreneurship  in  developing  countries. 
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Figure  1.  Causes  and  Effects  of  Corruption
Effects  of  Corruption:
Slower  Economic  Growth:  Mauro, 
1995  and  World  Bank,  1997.
Lower  Foreign  Direct  Investment: 
Henisz,  2000  and Wei,  2000.
Join-Ventures  instead  of  Owned 
Subsidiaries:  Smarzynksa  and  Wei, 
2000.
Higher  Unofficial  Activity:  De  Soto, 
1990,  Friedman  et  al.  2000  and 
Johnson  et  al.,  2000.
Inability  to  Raise  Revenue: 
Friedman  et  al.  2000  and  IADB, 
2000.
Less  Social  Spending:  Mauro 
(1998).
Lower  Development  Outcomes: 
Kaufmann  et  al.,  1999  and  IADB, 
2000
Existence  of  Rents:
Regulation:  Tanzi,  1994  and
Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1998.
Big  Governments:  Tanzi,  1994.
Natural  Endowments:    Ades  and   
Di  Tella,  1999  and Leite  and 
Weidmann,1996.
Closed  Economies:  Ades  and  Di
Tella,  1999.
Absence  of  Democracy: 
Autocracy:  Rodrik,  1997 and 
Diamond  and  Plattner,  1993.
Lower  Political  Participation: 
IADB,  2000. 
Constraints  on  Free  Press:  IADB, 
2000.
Political  Instability:  Persson  and 
Tabellini,  2000.
Lack  of  Checks  and  Balances: 
Henisz,  2000.
Institutional  Variables: 
Civil  Law  Systems:  La  Porta 
et  al.,  1999.
Hierarchical  Religions:  La 
Porta,  et  al.,  1999.
Lower  Education  and  Lower 
GDP  per  Capita:  Treisman, 
2000.
Excessive  Centralism: 
Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1993  28 
Figure  2.  Corruption  as  an  obstacle  to  doing  business
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Corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business corr1 46% 59% 17%
Bribes  are  common  in  one's  line  of  business corr2 23% 28% 12%
Firms  do  not  know  in  advance  the  value  of  the  bribe corr3 23% 27% 16%
Service  is  not  delivered  after  paying corr4 21% 25% 13%
Other  officials  require  payments  for  the  same  service corr5 12% 14% 7%
Officials  from  power  company  requested  bribes 9% 12% 2%
Officials  from  phone  company  requested  bribes 9% 12% 2%
Business  licensing  officials  requested  bribes 11% 14% 5%
Tax  agency  inspectors  requested  bribes 12% 16% 3%
Government  procurement  agents  requested  bribes 7% 9% 2%
Custom  agents  requested  bribes 13% 18% 2%
Judges  or  court  officials  requested  bribes 5% 7% 2%
Politicians  requested  bribes 6% 7% 5%
Any  of  the  previous  officials  requested  bribes corr6 30% 39% 10%
Crime  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business crime 53% 67% 22%




Table  2.  Government  Agencies  More  Likely  to  Request  bribes  in  1999 
 
Argentina:  Tax  Agency  (28%)  and  Business  License  (16%). 
Bolivia:  Tax  Agency  (41%),  Business  License  (28%)  and  Customs  (28%). 
Brazil:  Tax  Agency  (17%)  and  Business  License  (16%).     
Chile:  Customs  (6%)  and  Tax  agency  (5%). 
Colombia:  Customs  (20%),  Telephone  Company  (11%)  and  Politicians  (11%). 
Costa  Rica:  Customs  (30%)  and  Telephone  Company  (12%). 
Dominican  Republic:  Tax  Agency  (43%)  and  Customs  (27%)     
Ecuador:  Telephone  (53%),  Power  (42%)  and  Tax  Agency  (35%).   
El  Salvador:  Customs  (9%)  and  Telephone  Company  (7%). 
Guatemala:  Customs  (19%)  and  Business  License  (14%). 
Haiti:  Telephone  (57%),  Power  (47%)  and  Business  License  (37%).   
Honduras:  Telephone  Company  (24%)  and  Power  Company  (23%). 
Mexico:  Business  License  (28%)  and  Tax  Agency  (24%). 
Nicaragua:  Customs  (21%). 
Panama:  Tax  agency  (21%)  and  Customs  (19%).   
Peru:  Business  License  (27%),  Customs  (18%)  and  Courts  (17%). 
Uruguay:  Customs  (17%). 
Venezuela:  Customs  (23%)  and  Business  License  (16%).  
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corr1 corr2 corr3 corr4 corr5 corr6 crime
corr1 1.0000
corr2 0.7694* 1.0000
corr3 0.6084* 0.2621 1.0000
corr4 0.6500* 0.7360* 0.5051* 1.0000
corr5 0.6877* 0.7076* 0.5328* 0.6426* 1.0000
corr6 0.8574* 0.8054* 0.5107* 0.7615* 0.5806* 1.0000
crime 0.8905* 0.6701* 0.5823* 0.6184* 0.6795* 0.7816* 1.0000
Values  show  Pearson  Correlations.  *  Siginificant  at  5  %. 
See  Table  1  for  variable  definitions. 
Table  3.  Pairwise  Correlations  of  Country  Means
Corruption  is  an  obstacle Corruption  is  not  an  obstacle
Crime  is  an  obstacle 15 1
Crime  is  not  an  obstacle 0 13
Table  4.  Corruption  and  Crime  in  the  Private  Sector  Survey
Corruption  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business corr1 0.8498
Bribes  are  common  in  one's  line  of  business corr2 0.7914
Firms  do  not  know  in  advance  the  value  of  the  bribe corr3 0.3585
Service  is  not  delivered  after  paying corr4 0.6708
Other  officials  require  payments  for  the  same  service corr5 0.3848
Crime  is  an  obstacle  to  doing  business crime 0.8507





Firm  is  in  manufacturing 36.0%
Number  of  employees  is  5  to  50 33.5%
Number  of  employees  is  51  to  500 41.7%
Number  of  employees  is  500+ 24.7%
Commercial  firm 22.3%
Firm  is  located  in  capital  city  of  country 61.5%
Firm  is  located  in  large  city 19.7%
Firm  is  located  in  small  city  or  countryside 18.8%
Years  of  functioning 27.9
Government  has  financial  stake  in  the  firm 4.2%
Foreign  companies  have  financial  stake  in  the  firm 23.1%
Firm  exports 34.7%
Firm  have  sales  to  state  sector 45.4%
Table  6.    Mean  Characteristics  of  Surveyed  Firms 
Corr1 Corr2 Corr6 Crime
Firm  is  in  manufacturing 0.025 -0.006 -0.003 0.029
(0.95) (0.31) (0.12) (1.14)
Number  of  employees  is  51  to  500 -0.076 -0.013 <0.000 -0.085
(2.88)** (0.68) (0.02) (3.22)**
Number  of  employees  is  500+ -0.118 -0.069 -0.064 -0.065
(3.69)** (2.98)** (2.33)* (1.96)
Commercial  firm 0.006 -0.023 0.037 0.028
(0.21) (1.09) (1.47) (1.04)
Firm  is  located  in  capital  city  of  country -0.044 0.020 0.026 -0.076
(1.38) (0.77) (0.91) (2.49)*
Firm  is  located  in  large  city -0.016 -0.017 0.01 -0.038
(0.42) (0.54) (0.27) (1.04)
Years  of  functioning <0.000 -0.001 -0.001 <0.000
(1.10) (1.66) (2.09)* (1.38)
Government  has  financial  stake  in  the  firm -0.105 -0.041 -0.067 -0.095
(1.76) (0.85) (1.29) (1.67)
Foreign  companies  have  financial  stake  in  the  firm <0.000 -0.044 -0.001 -0.058
(0.01) (2.04)* (0.05) (2.20)*
Firm  exports -0.018 0.003 0.044 -0.052
(0.66) (0.11) (1.77) (2.02)*
Firm  have  sales  to  state  sector 0.024 0.020 0.015 -0.003
(1.06) (1.03) (0.75) (0.14)
Subjective  Perceptions  of  Quality  of  Public  Services 0.030 0.038 0.038 0.043
(2.15)* (3.72)** (3.11)** (3.06)**
Observations 2612 2556 2518 2671
Number  of  countries 29 29 29 29
Absolute  value  of  z  statistics  in  parentheses
*  significant  at  5%  level;  **  significant  at  1%  level
Small  firms  and  firms  located  in  the  country  side  are  the  baseline  groups
Table  7.  Firm  characteristics  and  the  Incidence  of  Corruption  and  Crime
Marginal  Effects  --  Probit  Estimation  35 
Corruption
Indicator
Corr1 Corr2 Corr6 Crime
Estimaded  d -1.508 -0.442 0.081 -2.012
(1.01) (0.27) (0.05) (1.35)
N 2337 2300 2347 2383
R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Absolute  Value  of  t-statistics  in  parantheses
*  Significant  at  5%  level;  **  significant  at  1%  level
Controls  include  firm  characteristics  and  country  fixed  effects.
Table  9.  Investment  Growth  and  Corruption  at  the  Firm  Level
Corruption
Indicator
Corr1 Corr2 Corr6 Crime
Estimaded  d -0.715 -0.848 -0.783 -1.588
(0.58) (0.63) (0.62) (1.30)
N 2434 2389 2433 2476
R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Absolute  Value  of  t-statistics  in  parantheses
*  Significant  at  5%  level;  **  significant  at  1%  level
Controls  include  firm  characteristics  and  country  fixed  effects.
Table  10.  Employment  Growth  and  Corruption  at  the  Firm  Level
Corruption
Indicator
Corr1 Corr2 Corr6 Crime
Estimated d -2.698 -2.103 -1.775 -3.400
(1.87)* (1.34) (1.20) (2.36)*
N 2385 2342 2383 2426
R-Squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Absolute  Value  of  t-statistics  in  parentheses
*  Significant  at  5%  level;  **  significant  at  1%  level
Controls  include  firm  characteristics  and  country  fixed  effects.
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Table  11.  Distribution  of  Time  Fraction  Wasted  by  Senior 
Management  in  Bureaucratic  Red  Tape 
Range  Frequency  Percent  Cumulative 
x=0  1712  63.6%  63.6% 
0<x
￿ 5  460  17.1%  80.7% 
5<x
￿ 10  235  8.7%  89.5% 
10<x
￿ 15  54  2.0%  91.5% 
15<x
￿ 20  87  3.2%  94.7% 
20<x
￿ 25  23  0.9%  95.6% 
25<x
￿ 30  41  1.5%  97.1% 
30<x
￿ 50  50  1.9%  99.0% 





Corr1 Corr2 Corr6 Crime
Estimaded  a 2.261 -0.086 3.890 0.736
(1.90)* (0.06) (3.21)** (0.62)
N 2457 2410 2464 2509
Pseudo  R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Absolute  Value  of  t-statistics  in  parantheses
*  Significant  at  5%  level;  **  significant  at  1%  level
Controls  include  firm  characteristics  and  country  fixed  effects.
Table  12.  Bureacratic  Delay  and  Corruption  at  the  Firm  Level
Tobit  Model 